A new normative economics for the formation of shared social values by Ravenscroft, Neil
1 
 
A new normative economics for the formation of shared social values 1 
Neil Ravenscroft 2 
School of Environment & Technology, University of Brighton, Lewes Road, Brighton BN2 3 
4GJ, UK 4 
 5 
N.Ravenscroft@brighton.ac.uk  6 
Introduction 7 
 8 
It is widely accepted that transition towards a more sustainable society is in part dependent 9 
upon an ability to link scientific knowledges - generated in fields such as sustainability 10 
science - with socio-political actions that foster sustainable outcomes. For Miller, et al (2014: 11 
p.239), this is about strengthening ‘… the role of values in science and decision-making for 12 
sustainability,’ while for Rodriguez-Morales and Rawluk (this issue), it is primarily about the 13 
deployment of political power in sustainability decision-making processes. In their work, 14 
Westberg and Polk (2016) argue that this is about catalysing knowledge exchange between 15 
sustainability science and society in such a way that new composite, socially constructed, 16 
knowledges are generated that can inform the development of sustainability policy. As 17 
Rawluk, et al (this issue) argue, this revolves around complex social-ecological 18 
conceptualisations of values that inform the resource trade-offs that society is prepared to 19 
accept in pursuit of sustainability, with the fundamental question being one of how choices 20 
are made about these trade-offs (see also Anderson, et al, 2015, 2016).  21 
 22 
Conventionally, in neoclassical economics, the social welfare questions raised by the pursuit 23 
of sustainability have been addressed by reference to the aggregation of individual 24 
preferences – often expressed and captured through market mechanisms (Bartkowski and 25 
Lienhoop, 2018). While it has long been understood that this approach is inadequate (see 26 
Massenberg, this issue), as well as often inappropriate (Lienhoop, et al, 2015), the 27 
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development of more appropriate approaches has only emerged in the last 20 years. In 28 
particular, those working in the field of ecological economics have developed new ways of 29 
thinking that move away from the descriptive and positivist assumptions underpinning 30 
neoclassical economics towards a more normative interest in questions about what ought to 31 
be (Sagoff, 1998; Wilson and Howarth, 2002; Wilson and Hoehn, 2006; Pelletier, 2010; 32 
Kenter, et al, 2014, 2015; Richardson, et al, 2015; Dryzek and Pickering, 2017; Strunz, et al, 33 
2017). In particular, new ways have been sought for overcoming the limitations of 34 
neoclassical economics, particularly with respect to recognising that social values are both 35 
plural and shared (see, for example, Bartkowski and Lienhoop, 2018; Lien, et al, 2018).  36 
 37 
As such, ecological economics has offered new insights into the types of evidence required 38 
for decision making, particularly when sustainability is understood as a ‘post-normal science’ 39 
that is characterised by partial evidence that would in other – positivist - contexts be viewed 40 
as insufficiently reliable for decision making (Ainscough, et al, 2018). However, as Kenter, 41 
Bryce, et al (2016: p368) have observed, this means that we now need a ‘new valuation 42 
language’ that is capable of expressing, rather than simply capturing, plural shared social 43 
values that are formed in response to specific post-normal situations. While the need for a 44 
new language might be recognised, there is as yet little work on what form it might take 45 
(Sagoff, 1998; Wilson and Howarth, 2002; Wilson and Hoehn, 2006; Kenter, et al, 2011; 46 
Dryzek and Pickering, 2017), nor how values should be articulated if not through a market-47 
based institution.  This is because, as Irvine, et al (2016) and Kenter (2016) have argued, 48 
some policy questions are so complex or socially sensitive that individuals are unlikely to 49 
hold fully pre-formed values with respect to them, meaning that a deliberative intervention is 50 
necessary to enable these individuals collectively to form and express their shared social 51 
values – reflecting in a normative sense what they determine to be the values that ought to be 52 
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held by the group. In this sense, shared social values are those values that we form and 53 
express in common as a result of formal deliberative processes (Kenter, et al, 2015). They 54 
thus reflect a specific construction of social value that is distinct from other value types – 55 
such as individually-held other-regarding values - and other value discourses (see Horcea-56 
Milcu, et al, this issue). 57 
 58 
This recognition of a normative economic proposition is entirely appropriate to the study of 59 
shared social values for sustainability, since ‘… the idea of sustainability is intrinsically 60 
normative’ (Schmieg, et al, 2018: p.785; see also Horcea-Milcu, et al, this issue). Indeed, the 61 
normative link between economics and sustainability lies at the core of both fields, in their 62 
concern with conceptualising the basis upon which resource allocation decisions are made 63 
(Pelletier, 2010). What differs is the purpose ascribed to such decisions, with the 64 
conventional normative proposition in economics being related to maximising surplus 65 
(Schmidt, 2017) through the maximisation of individual utilities (Bartkowski and Lienhoop, 66 
2018), while in sustainability it has a broader understanding related to inter- and intra-67 
generational distributive justice (Miller, et al, 2014; Warlenius et al, 2015; Heindl and 68 
Kanschik, 2016). This asymmetry represents a schism between the theoretical traditions that 69 
inform sustainability science and those that inform economics (see Rawluk, et al, this issue). 70 
This offers a space in which to investigate how far a renewed recognition of the normative 71 
purposes that economics can have might provide new ways of not only identifying shared 72 
social values for sustainability, but also ways of operationalising a new approach to 73 
articulating these values in forms that are suitable for policy development.  Indeed, it is 74 
apparent that a new normative approach to economics could have the capacity to encourage 75 
the formation of shared social values that harmonise with sustainability goals to the extent 76 
4 
 
that the market is no longer constructed as the primary value articulating institution for 77 
sustainability.   78 
 79 
The paper will commence with a review of normative economics and the formation of shared 80 
social values that attempts to bridge the spectrum between broad transcendental values and 81 
more place and time specific contextual values (see Kenter, et al, 2015; Raymond and Kenter, 82 
2016). In so doing, the paper recognises the conventional distinction made between 83 
normative and positive (or descriptive) economics: that the former deals with distributive 84 
questions about what ought to be while the latter limits itself to largely value-free 85 
descriptions of contemporary economic phenomena. However, the paper argues that the 86 
distinction is less significant than the need to articulate the purpose for which economic 87 
analysis is undertaken.  And this, of course, also means clarifying the value articulating 88 
institutions that are required to operationalise shared social values. The final substantive 89 
section of the paper identifies five new principles that are necessary for the development of a 90 
new normative value articulating institution that can form and express shared social values in 91 
ways that are appropriate to sustainability science, policy and practice.     92 
 93 
Reworking normative economics to form shared social values for sustainability 94 
 95 
Shared social values are fundamentally normative - because the purpose that we ascribe to 96 
them is to guide collective decision-making (Sagoff, 1988; Pelletier, 2010; Irvine, et al, 97 
2016). They are typically deployed in complex policy areas such as sustainability (Schmieg, 98 
et al, 2018), where multiple constructions of value shape the ways in which we individually 99 
and collectively understand the world (Horcea-Milcu, et al, this issue). This can lead to us 100 
taking up deontological positions in which the shared social values that we form or identify 101 
collectively are not necessarily consistent with what we perceive to be our own self-interests 102 
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(O’Neill and Spash, 2000). These ‘extra-personal’ values are nevertheless likely to be 103 
informed by our individual perspective – as far as we can determine it - and are thus likely to 104 
include both transcendental (general) and contextual (specific to a given situation) values (see 105 
Kenter, et al, 2015; Raymond and Kenter, 2016). But we are highly unlikely to perceive these 106 
social values as simply an extension of our own values, nor as an aggregation of the 107 
individual values of all those affected. Rather, in making normative judgements we are likely 108 
to identify for ourselves a ‘hybrid’ position in which we believe that certain values ‘ought’ to 109 
be common, public, or shared, even if they are inconsistent with our own interests. Evidence 110 
from Raymond and Kenter (2016) indicates that this hybrid position is likely to be further 111 
modified by discussion with others, with Bartkowski and Lienhoop (2018) noting a number 112 
of studies in which individuals have modified their views as they have learnt more about the 113 
subject in question. Consequently, as Sagoff (1988) and Pelletier (2010) have argued, such 114 
shared social values cannot fully emerge from standard neoclassical environmental economic 115 
valuation methods that seek to elicit and aggregate individual values, but instead require an 116 
alternative – deliberative - approach and new ‘rules of the game’ (Kenter, et al, 2016; 117 
Landsburg, 2007) that are (per)formed through new value articulating institutions.  118 
 119 
As Landsburg (2007) has observed, the idea of developing new value articulating institutions 120 
is uncomfortable territory because such institutions will identify social values that are formed 121 
– and reformed - outside the economic models to which they will be applied. This is 122 
particularly the case for the normative criterion of distributional justice that is core to issues 123 
of sustainability (Pelletier, 2010). This means that the new rules of the game will need to 124 
encompass plurality (O’Neill and Spash, 2000; Kenter, et al, 2015) by recognising that people 125 
may simultaneously care about the environment normatively (ie independent of its effect on 126 
them personally), subjectively (ie in full recognition of their own material well-being) and 127 
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contextually (ie with respect to a specific situation). This corresponds with the value 128 
spectrum proposed by Kenter, et al (2015: p89) in which transcendental values influence 129 
contextual values which, in turn, influence how shared values are expressed.  This suggests 130 
that the assessment of transcendental values may be key to developing new value articulating 131 
institutions although, as Raymond and Kenter (2016) have observed, there have been few 132 
studies of this type. As Raymond and Kenter (2016: p.241) argue, transcendental values – 133 
which are associated with ‘… ethical principles and desirable end states … that transcend 134 
specific situations’ – are important in terms of the social values of sustainability because they 135 
affect behaviours and influence how we view and use knowledge and evidence. Yet, as they 136 
go on to show, this does not mean that such transcendental values are necessarily a well-137 
formed and stable platform from which to deliberate subjective and contextual values.  There 138 
is, thus, a need to reconsider how we understand and work with normative economics and 139 
values. 140 
 141 
Academic interest in normative economics has increased as it has become clear that markets 142 
do not always provide suitable institutions for making resource allocation decisions, and that 143 
maximising surplus is not always a suitable singular goal. While there is relative consensus 144 
that normative economics focusses on questions of ‘what ought to be or ought to happen’ 145 
(McQuillin and Sugden, 2012), there is much debate about what this means, particularly in 146 
terms of the relationship that economics has with concepts such as welfare, choice, norms, 147 
value judgments and policy decisions (see also Massenberg, this issue).  This has led Mongin 148 
(2006) to propose the following understanding: 149 
 150 
… the task of normative economics is to investigate methods and criteria for 151 
evaluating the relative desirability of economic states of affairs. This is a 152 
noncommittal statement because it does not say whether normative economics 153 
itself endorses the evaluations (and thus makes value judgments) or just explores 154 
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the way of making them (and thus only relates to value judgments). Furthermore, 155 
it does not decide either whether a more desirable state is one involving more 156 
welfare, or more preference satisfaction. (Mongin, 2006: p. 20) 157 
 158 
As this approach suggests, the factor that separates normative from positive economics is 159 
fundamentally an epistemic question about the extent to which any given analysis is bounded 160 
by an articulation of the purpose of that analysis. For Mongin – although not all economists 161 
(see Kolm, 2000) - it is not necessarily the purpose of normative economics to make 162 
judgments about relative outcomes, but it is its purpose to ensure that there is clarity about 163 
the desired economic state of affairs and certainty about how relative changes in this state of 164 
affairs are to be measured and reported. Thus, it is not that markets are necessarily 165 
inappropriate institutions for articulating normative values but, rather, that the 166 
appropriateness of the value articulating institution cannot be determined separately from the 167 
purpose of the valuation exercise (see, for example, Cory, 2006, who argues that markets 168 
operate on the basis of dual physiological motives rather than the singularity of self-interest 169 
that is conventionally attributed to them). Thus, conventional markets are suitable for some 170 
purposes, while in others we are likely to require a more sophisticated approach that 171 
acknowledges both distributive justice and biophysical limits (see Schmidt, 2017).  172 
 173 
This suggests that the significance of turning to normative economics lies less in any claim 174 
that it may have to privilege distributive justice or scale concerns, and more in the need to 175 
articulate clearly the basis upon which the distribution of resources will be undertaken 176 
(Pelletier, 2010; Warlenius, et al, 2015; Heindl and Kanschik, 2016). Conventionally, of 177 
course, we have tended to deal with questions about distributive priorities and scale by 178 
intervening in market allocation mechanisms in order to reallocate surplus in particular ways. 179 
However, as Schmidt (2017) observes, this assumes that the cost of redistribution is 180 
negligible and that particular distributive outcomes are more important than the processes 181 
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used to achieve them. As Schmidt (2017) demonstrates, neither of these conditions holds in 182 
many situations, because it is highly unlikely that an unfair or inequitable process can be 183 
rendered fair simply by changing who gets what, and at a cost that is less than changing the 184 
process in the first place. This is particularly the case where allocation is founded on 185 
transcendental values that are unlikely to be coherently expressed in conventional markets – 186 
if only because wealthier people will have more consumption possibilities and thus more 187 
behavioural choice than poor people (McQillin and Sugden, 2012).  188 
 189 
Thus, as Kolm (2000) and Bartkowski and Lienhoop (2018) have argued, distribution 190 
questions cannot be separated from their procedural and ethical dimensions – because it is 191 
these very dimensions that identify the values required for decision making. Indeed, if we 192 
accept that the shortcoming of conventional economics lies in its failure to articulate an 193 
ideology that is appropriate for addressing issues of sustainability, we must surely accept that 194 
a new normative economics must achieve the opposite and embrace the ethical dimensions of 195 
distribution. This, however, presents us with a number of problems related to our (lack of) 196 
ability to elicit values from individual people:  197 
 198 
For at least the last three quarters of a century, both descriptive and normative 199 
economics have been based on assumptions about individual rationality. In 200 
descriptive economics, economic agents have been assumed to act as if seeking to 201 
satisfy preferences that are coherent—that is, stable, consistent and context-202 
independent. In normative analysis, economic institutions, projects or policies 203 
have been treated as justified to the extent that their outcomes are ranked highly 204 
in the preference orderings that agents have been assumed to possess. (McQuillin 205 
and Sugden, 2012: p.553-4). 206 
 207 
 208 
This issue is at the core of the separation between normative and positive economics: how 209 
can we justify placing the individual at the centre of resource allocation decisions when the 210 
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questions being asked are normative ones about ecological sustainability and distributive 211 
justice (see Costanza and Folke, 1997)? The answer, for Pelletier (2010), Wilson and 212 
Howarth (2002), and for Massenberg (this issue) with respect to the interdependency of 213 
individual preferences, is that we cannot make such a justification and, instead, must view 214 
each individual as a member of a social unit whose well-being is inseparable from the well-215 
being of every other member of that unit. In this construction of economics, values must 216 
inherently be social, to the extent that there is no separate or over-riding self-interest to be 217 
elicited. And social, in this context, must mean debated and deliberated by individuals in a 218 
democratic forum to which all community members have access, for how else are social 219 
values to be formed and prioritised (see Lo and Spash, 2013)?  220 
 221 
Operationalising new valuation principles for (per)forming social values for 222 
sustainability 223 
 224 
The consequence of this line of argument is that there are three primary conditions for 225 
normative economics to generate shared social values for sustainability: that there is an 226 
agreed definition of distributive justice that will ensure social and ecological equity; that 227 
economic activity is understood in terms of social units comprising individual actors; and that 228 
the process for determining shared social values and, thus, the distribution of resources, is 229 
democratic community-based deliberation. Following work by Spash (2007) and Lo and 230 
Spash (2013), these conditions  have been incorporated into a new approach to valuation,  231 
referred to as Deliberative Monetary Value (DMV) (Kenter, Reed, et al, 2016), and have 232 
informed a growing number of valuation studies (see, for example, Jobstvogt, et al, 2014; 233 
Orchard-Webb, et al, 2016). All DMV exercises consist of facilitated small groups of 234 
participants reflecting, discussing, learning and making judgements about the monetary 235 
valuation of environmental and other public goods or policies (Kenter, 2017) in order to ‘ … 236 
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establish contextual values around different options, and [to determine]  a preferred option, 237 
which is well informed and reasoned’ (Kenter, Reed, et al, 2016: p.195-6). 238 
 239 
While offering an apparently coherent approach that addresses many of the limitations of 240 
conventional economic valuation, Bartkowski and Lienhoop (2018: p.97) urge caution 241 
because it is really little more than the addition of deliberation to neoclassical welfare 242 
economic theory, and thus ‘… lacks a convincing, consistent theoretical foundation.’ The 243 
limitations that this imposes are exposed if we question the extent to which distributive 244 
justice should take into account more-than-human interests. While it might be axiomatic that 245 
sustainability should be understood from a whole ecosystem perspective, there is little 246 
evidence available about what this means in terms of procedural justice, with work on 247 
ecosystem service assessments remaining decidedly anthropocentric (see, for example, Diaz, 248 
et al, 2018). Similarly, while it is possible to think of more-than-human entities being 249 
included within a broad definition of a social unit, it is hard to conceive of how such entities 250 
would participate in the deliberative processes anticipated in the third condition. Of course, 251 
this latter analysis can be extended to anyone who is not present at the deliberative event, or 252 
who is otherwise inhibited from participating.    253 
 254 
In addition to the issue of who or what is, or is not, part of the deliberation, the actual process 255 
of shared social value formation is clearly dependent on a complex set of conditions that 256 
foster social interaction and learning for sustainability, which are linked to questions about 257 
how social groups undertake envisioning exercises that allow them to relate co-formed social 258 
values to their own sustainability practices (Miller, et al, 2014; Kenter, 2017). A range of 259 
conditions has been identified in the literature, including important work by Bartkowski and 260 
Lienhoop (2018), but what is now required is an improved ‘… understanding of how values 261 
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are formed and enacted’ (Kenter, Reed, et al, 2016: p.194). The contribution that a normative 262 
economic perspective can make to this is the identification of a new set of valuation 263 
principles that can elaborate the institutional framework that is required in order to form and 264 
express shared social values for sustainability. Building on the work of Bartkowski and 265 
Lienhoop (2018), it is proposed that there are five key principles of normative value 266 
formation: 267 
 268 
1. That social units are the appropriate scale of analysis for forming shared values that 269 
are ‘extra-personal’ and reflect current understandings of distributive justice; 270 
2. That there is procedural justice in the deliberation of shared social values, relating to 271 
both human and more-than-human interests; 272 
3. That decision-making is a constitutive process with instrumental outcomes that is 273 
informed by deliberative valuation processes; 274 
4. That a new dialectical approach to political decision making is required; and 275 
5. That a ‘value bank’ is required, based on a new concept of Social Value Transfer 276 
(SVT). 277 
 278 
1. That social units are the appropriate scale of analysis for forming shared values 279 
that are ‘extra-personal’ and reflect current understandings of distributive justice 280 
 281 
The condition that social values are formed by social units - such as groups or communities - 282 
requires us to stop thinking only about individuals having the capacity to hold values on 283 
behalf of others as well as themselves (what Kenter, et al, 2015, have referred to as ‘other 284 
regarding values’).  What is required instead is a more plural position in which individuals 285 
are part of social units which foster a capacity within these individuals to form normative 286 
values that comprise both transcendental and contextual elements. As Barbopoulos and 287 
Johansson (2016) argue, the normative goal of acting appropriately is based on the relative 288 
weight that people put on their moral obligation to do the right thing and broader social 289 
pressures to fit in and belong – which is enhanced by group deliberation. For many, this 290 
coalesces around ideas of environmental justice, understood broadly as the right of all people 291 
to enjoy a clean and healthy environment and to be protected from harm caused by 292 
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environmental pollution (Martin, et al, 2013). Schlosberg and Collins (2014: p.359) add that 293 
there should be a focus on ‘… local impacts and experience, inequitable vulnerabilities, the 294 
importance of community voice, and demands for community sovereignty and functioning.’ 295 
 296 
Shifting focus from the atomised individual to the individual as part of a group also requires a 297 
new approach to determining the appropriate size for the group for a deliberative exercise. 298 
This depends upon whether the requirement is for stakeholder-based political representation, 299 
or a broader statistical approach to representation. In environmental management the 300 
emphasis is typically on stakeholder groups, whereas in deliberative democracy the emphasis 301 
tends to be on mini-publics or mini-demos which are quasi randomly sampled to represent the 302 
population (see Ranger, et al, 2016). In terms of the basis of deliberation, the normative 303 
principle means that valuation exercises start from ethical questions about what is best for 304 
society (Sagoff, 1998). This means that the new principles must understand sustainability as a 305 
capital good, where trade-offs have to be made on the basis of social investment. Consistent 306 
with Irvine, et al (2016), this means shifting valuation exercises from a focus on the 307 
satisfaction of individual wants to one in which the gesture is associated with a shared sense 308 
of what society ought to do, in terms of distributive justice. This means that normative social 309 
values are essentially ‘extra-personal’, or plural, and beyond those of the individual. 310 
 311 
2. That there is procedural justice in the deliberation of shared social values, relating 312 
to both human and more-than-human interests 313 
 314 
For many of those working in the field of sustainability, the concept of procedural justice 315 
carries equal, if not more, weight than distributive justice, on the basis that we can design 316 
procedures that are just, even if we cannot be sure that any given outcome will achieve 317 
distributive justice (Eggleston, 2004). Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice provides a foundation 318 
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from which to develop an understanding of how procedural justice can be brought into the 319 
formation of shared social values related to sustainability. Central to Rawls’ thesis was the 320 
idea of the ‘original position’ as a state in which fair social decisions can be made that would 321 
have unanimous public support (what he termed perfect justice). In order to achieve this 322 
position, Rawls (1971: p.141) suggested that everyone involved in a distribution exercise has 323 
to be denied certain ‘… morally irrelevant information …‘such as their relative wealth, social 324 
status and position with regard to the resources to be distributed. In this way, everyone is in 325 
the same ‘original position’ and can thus make judgments free of their own individual self-326 
interests. In accepting that the original position cannot be achieved, Sen (2002, 2010) has 327 
proposed the idea of using an ‘impartial spectator’ in deliberative processes whose purpose is 328 
to ensure that the perspectives of those who are not present are taken into account. Of course, 329 
these perspectives could include those of more-than-human entities.  330 
 331 
What is clear is that procedural justice in deliberative valuation exercises requires a shift 332 
towards ideas of a knowledge polity in which narrow constructs of (economic) expertise can 333 
be broadened towards a new emphasis on addressing issues of public concern through a broad 334 
range of expertises – of which economics will be one (Hansjürgens et al., 2017, and 335 
Massenberg, this issue, discuss a similar approach in relation to Buchanan’s Constitutional 336 
Economics). This reflects the emergence of a new epistemology of knowledge – and value - 337 
formation that moves beyond exchange to posit that knowledges – and values – are co-338 
produced by social groups (Callon, 1999) – and that the procedural element of value 339 
formation is fundamental. It also requires an understanding that choices are rational if those 340 
making the choices can sustain them when subjected to scrutiny (Sen, 2010). As Bartkowski 341 
and Lienhoop (2018) observe, this is very much part of Habermas’ (1983) communicative 342 
rationality in that individual participants develop, through deliberation with others, positions 343 
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which, to them, are rational and defensible. This is what Callon (1999) has termed a new 344 
'technical democracy' in which the formation of composite knowledges and their associated 345 
normative values should emerge from dialogue in which all forms of expertise are 346 
recognised.  347 
 348 
This approach to doing sustainability science has been used in England to address knowledge 349 
controversies associated with flooding, through the formation of ‘competency groups’ that 350 
have brought together a range of specialists and local people to take an holistic approach to 351 
water management and flood prevention (Whatmore, 2009; Donaldson, et al, 2010). One of 352 
the key purposes of the groups is to develop new collective competences in handling what 353 
Whatmore (2009: p. 595) terms the ‘double uncertainty’ of flood-risk knowledge that has the 354 
capacity to redistribute expertise across the expert/lay divide. Deliberated shared social 355 
values lie at the core of these competencies. These values are both transcendental and 356 
contextual and, while they may have elements of aggregated individual utility, they go 357 
beyond this by making the dialogic element both instrumental – in identifying acceptable 358 
norms – and constitutive of group agreement – and the need for the outcomes to be 359 
acceptable to all (Hansjürgens, et al, 2017: p.14). 360 
 361 
3. Decision-making is a constitutive process with instrumental outcomes that is 362 
informed by deliberative valuation processes 363 
 364 
Rather than the causal rationality of neoclassical economics, in which a specific process will 365 
elicit a specific answer, ecological rationality is based very much in the realms of social 366 
practices that do not necessarily conclude with consensus (Elster, 1982; Sen, 2002). Indeed, 367 
as Costanza, et al (2017: p.7) have observed, the apparently simple process of listing values, 368 
or ecosystem services, can make them sufficiently visible to be recognised in public policy. 369 
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This gives such activities both constitutive and instrumental purposes such that both the 370 
process and the outcome are significant. This is similarly the case with deliberative 371 
approaches to value formation, which are concerned with pooling knowledges and 372 
broadening group understanding of complex problems through a constitutive decision-373 
making process: 374 
 375 
Because the process of deliberation requires citizens to go beyond private self-376 
interest, it is … believed that the outcome will increase the social equity and 377 
political legitimacy of outcomes … In this manner, the process of discourse itself 378 
is taken to provide a ‘corrective function’ for situations where individual citizens 379 
alone possess incomplete information. Acting together, groups can piece together 380 
a more complete, and socially just, assessment of ecosystem goods and services. 381 
(Wilson and Howarth, 2002: p. 432) 382 
 383 
For others, the corrective function lies in the co-production, or co-formation, of outcomes that 384 
are, at once, constitutive of those involved and also reflective of broader normative values 385 
related to everyone affected. As Hansjurgens, et al (2017) have argued, an outcome (or 386 
Habermasian ‘workable agreement’) is in this sense normatively ‘right’ if it has come about 387 
by participants agreeing on a course of action – even if this does not reflect a convergence in 388 
their preferences (Bartkowski and Lienhoop, 2018: p.99). The course of action is also rational 389 
if those involved can stand by it when questioned (Sen, 2010). This addresses Pelletier’s 390 
(2010) concern that we know little about how to operationalise outcome measures such as 391 
distributional justice, other than that they are founded on widely accepted ideas relating to 392 
freedom and equality, across time, for both humans and more-than-humans (see O’Connor 393 
and Kenter, this issue).   394 
 395 
4. A new dialectical approach to political decision making is required to ensure that 396 
decisions remain reversible until they have been extensively deliberated 397 
 398 
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All approaches to deliberative value formation are based, ultimately, on some form of group 399 
decision making process that, following Whatmore’s (2009) concept of the knowledge polity, 400 
is understood as inclusive and transparent, if not necessarily consensual (Bartkowski and 401 
Lienhoop, 2018). This is, of course, problematic because while deliberation can potentially 402 
promote understanding and generate new composite knowledges and values that reflect those 403 
involved, it must be accepted that it does not always result in consensus, at least initially.  For 404 
Dryzek and Pickering (2017: p.353), deliberation involves developing a highly reflexive 405 
approach to decision-making in which institutions have the capacity to reconfigure 406 
themselves and the decisions that they make in direct response to self-reflection on their 407 
performance.  There are countless examples of situations in which such an approach would 408 
have yielded more acceptable and convincing results without the need for reversing decisions 409 
that had seemingly been made. For example, Irvine, et al (2016) describe how the initial 410 
decisions made regarding the future of England’s public forest estate were subsequently 411 
found to be at odds with both public and expert opinions, and in need of substantial revision. 412 
 413 
If decisions are only to be confirmed once the decision makers are confident in the outcome 414 
of deliberation, there needs to be a process whereby they can understand how to react and 415 
proceed when consensus is not achieved. As Sen (2010) observes, a group of reasonable 416 
people may not reach consensus, even when experiencing an ‘ideal speech situation’ in 417 
Habermasian terms – perhaps because of deep moral convictions (Dryzek, 2013). Thus, 418 
following Bartkowski and Lienhoop (2018), deliberation needs to be seen as a form of 419 
negotiation in which participants remain free to express their preferences, without the need to 420 
arrive at a consensus.  421 
 422 
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Depending upon the circumstances, this outcome may be sufficient to inform policy makers 423 
about the range of values that persist after deliberation.  If it is not sufficient, because the 424 
preferences expressed remain too diverse to support a specific decision, or there is a need to 425 
identify a specific outcome or value, Bartkowski and Lienhoop (2018) recommend that a 426 
formal process of negotiation is used to achieve the best outcome available. While such an 427 
approach may be effective, Sen (2010) cautions that such negotiations could do little more 428 
than obscure the underlying conflicts. Thus, where consensus is illusive it may be necessary 429 
to restart the deliberative process, perhaps with new participants or different disinterested 430 
spectators. In the most complex situations, or where preferences remain diverse, the act of 431 
deliberation could be a relatively permanent part of a decision making process, with 432 
preferences being synthesised at regular intervals to update decision makers on the ways in 433 
which preferences are being formed, reformed and expressed.     434 
 435 
5. That a ‘value bank’ is required, based on a new concept of Social Value Transfer 436 
(SVT) 437 
 438 
The cost of producing value estimates in cases where there is little or no market evidence can 439 
be substantial (Wilson and Hoehn, 2006). This has led to the development of techniques for 440 
using economic information derived for one situation to infer the economic value of the good 441 
or service in question in another location or at another time. This process, known generically 442 
as benefit transfer, is used either to estimate new value functions by modifying and applying 443 
the original economic data, or to derive new value estimates by recalibrating the value 444 
functions generated in the original valuation exercise (Wilson and Hoehn, 2006; Dryzek and 445 
Pickering, 2017). Benefit transfer has been used extensively with respect to environmental 446 
goods and services (Richardson, et al, 2015), as well as  in global initiatives such as The 447 
Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (www.teebweb.org) and the The 448 
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Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 449 
(www.ipbes.net) (see Christie, et al, this issue). There are now databases of empirical 450 
studies on the economic value of environmental assets, including the Environmental 451 
Valuation Reference Inventory (www.evri.ca), which includes over 4,000 studies.  452 
 453 
Given the potential need to conduct numerous, and perhaps continuous, deliberative exercises 454 
to form shared social values, it is tempting to suggest that a modified form of benefit transfer 455 
- which we might term ‘social value transfer’ (SVT) – could be developed. If successful, this 456 
could facilitate the transfer of shared social values that have been deliberated for a primary 457 
site or policy initiative to an alternative site or policy scenario. Given that, in theory at least, 458 
the outcome of each deliberative exercise is unique, this is a highly contentious and perhaps 459 
deontological suggestion – one that certainly needs much theorisation and development. 460 
Indeed, benefit transfer itself remains highly controversial because of limited environmental 461 
data, poorly conducted primary studies and a rudimentary approach to validating the 462 
comparability of the primary and policy sites (Spash and Vatn, 2006).  However, given the 463 
potential advantages of making shared social values accessible to policy makers in a form and 464 
at a cost that they cannot ignore, it is worth pursuing as a potential policy option.   465 
 466 
In common with conventional benefits transfer, the quality of SVT would depend on 467 
developing a strong functional understanding of how the deliberated values are formed and 468 
expressed and, thus, how applicable they are likely to be in an alternative situation. More 469 
fundamentally, it may well be that the normative assumptions and relative weight of different  470 
moral criteria for deliberative valuations will differ from study to study, rendering the results 471 
incomparable even if they are commensurable in the sense of all being in similar – usually 472 
monetary - units. Alternatively, it could be that some shared elements do transfer, such as 473 
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broader transcendental values over a given period of time. This could mean that while it is 474 
not possible to undertake a full unit-based transfer from one site or policy to another, it could 475 
be possible to transfer a broad set of value indicators or parameters that can inform relatively 476 
limited deliberative processes applied to the new site or policy context.  Rather than an 477 
EVRI-style database, this could lend itself more to a functional approach in which a 478 
deliberated ‘library’ of transcendental values can be used for a range of approached to 479 
forming contextual values, for example through forms of behavioural economics and 480 
deliberative monetary valuation (see Cory, 2006; Spash, 2007; Lo and Spash, 2013; Kenter, 481 
2017).  482 
 483 
Conclusion: articulating the five principles for forming normative shared social values 484 
for sustainability 485 
 486 
In a recent review article, Costanza, et al (2017: p.7) observed that we really do not have a 487 
choice about whether or not to engage in the identification and application of social values 488 
for sustainability, because we are required to make decisions that ‘ … involve trade-offs 489 
between ranges of things that affect human wellbeing differently.’  The question, thus, is not 490 
whether we need to identify values, but rather, what kind of approach to valuation is most 491 
appropriate to determining and articulating social values.  Much work has been done in this 492 
respect, in terms of new approaches to conceptualising ecosystem services (Acott, 2017; 493 
Lien, et al, 2018) and in terms of increasingly sophisticated approaches to deliberation 494 
(Spash, 2007; Raymond, et al, 2014; Kenter, Reed, et al, 2016; Kenter, 2017) and social 495 
learning (Reed, et al, 2010). Increasingly, valuation exercises are able to express shared 496 
values in ways that move well beyond conventional neoclassical economics and offer insights 497 
into how people hold and form transcendental and contextual values for sustainability (see 498 
Kenter, et al, 2011; Orchard-Webb, et al, 2016).   499 
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 500 
Yet, there remain gaps in our application of economic theory to social values for 501 
sustainability, particularly with respect to the theoretical foundation of deliberative value 502 
formation. Indeed, Kenter, Bryce, et al (2016) have questioned the extent to which 503 
deliberation can create new democratic spaces and foster better decision making, while 504 
Bartkowski and Lienhoop (2018) maintain that, at the moment, the economic valuation of 505 
complex environmental goods and services is little more than an information tool that can be 506 
used to stimulate public debate. But, as Bartkowski and Lienhoop (2018) proceed to argue, 507 
recognising that deliberated value formation does not necessarily demand consensus, but 508 
instead allows for complexity and deeply held views, is a step forward.   509 
 510 
This is highly significant because while we have been ready to accept that sustainability is 511 
intrinsically normative (Schmieg, et al, 2018), we have been much less ready to ascribe a 512 
similar normative proposition to economics. Indeed, we have largely remained wedded to the 513 
conventional proposition that economic analysis is related to the maximisation of surplus 514 
(Schmidt, 2017), with ex-post interventions in markets to modify how this surplus is 515 
distributed. This has, inevitably, meant that many questions remain about how best to co-516 
ordinate and develop work in the field of deliberative value formation, particularly around the 517 
‘rules of the game’ (Kenter, Bryce, et al, 2016: p. 366) that are required concerning the 518 
processes of forming and expressing shared social values.  519 
 520 
In addressing the need for a new set of rules, this paper has sought to return economics to its 521 
normative foundations, by arguing that surplus maximisation is but one of a number of 522 
normative purposes to which economic analysis can be applied. In particular, the paper has 523 
proposed five principles for forming and expressing social values. These are based on a 524 
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normative approach in which the focus of value switches from the individual to social units 525 
such as communities and broader society, with an associated epistemology in which such 526 
shared social values are formed and articulated through dialectical deliberative social 527 
processes. This approach is thus founded on the principles that both procedural and 528 
distributive justice must be accounted for in the formation of shared social values for 529 
sustainability. The theoretical position therefore reflects the harmonisation of normative 530 
sustainability goals with a procedural approach to economic theory that is founded on justice 531 
for both human and, potentially, more-than-human entities. The emphasis of this new 532 
approach is thus on sustainability itself, with the economic purpose being to form and express 533 
shared social values in ways that articulate the choices that we – society - seek to make in 534 
determining how we allocate resources, before we undertake an allocation process.  This 535 
reflects a new world of ‘post-normal’ science (De Marchi and Ravetz, 2001; Ainscough, et al, 536 
2018) in which there are few certainties upon which to base complex political decisions.  537 
 538 
What the five principles offer, therefore, is the foundation for creating a new set of normative 539 
valuation rules – and an associated value articulating institution - that are applicable to a 540 
range of policy decisions related to sustainability science. In recognising the need for an 541 
approach to procedural and distributive justice that is consistent with sustainability science, 542 
the principles seek to address the concern expressed by Kenter, et al (2016) that 543 
developments in the practice of deliberation have put more emphasis on technique than they 544 
have on the processes through which shared values are formed and expressed. The principles 545 
also recognise that – in theory - each deliberative exercise is unique, because the co-546 
constructed knowledges that are generated are necessarily unique to those involved. This 547 
implies forming and expressing shared social values for each circumstance in which a 548 
decision is required.  Not only is this impractical, but there is little indication yet that it is 549 
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entirely necessary – because while each deliberation exercise may be unique, it is far from 550 
clear whether the outcomes produced are similarly unique, or are informed, for example, by a 551 
relatively stable set of transcendental values. Thus, just as approaches have been developed 552 
for ‘transferring’ the economic benefits from one cost-benefit study to another, there may 553 
also be scope for establishing a new form of Social Value Transfer (SVT) which provides a 554 
mechanism whereby deliberated social values from one situation can be applied to other 555 
similar situations and contexts. While remaining no more than an idea at this stage, such an 556 
approach could provide indications of shared social value in cases where the cost of forming 557 
a new set of values is greater than the likely benefit of doing so.  558 
 559 
However, questions must inevitably remain about how far values formed and expressed in 560 
one setting can be transferred at all. Work to date indicates that transcendental values are 561 
themselves relatively stable because they are very much part of people’s identity (Kenter, et 562 
al, 2015). However, as Kenter, Bryce, et al (2016) have argued, the extent to which specific 563 
transcendental values are activated tends to be dependent on the context and framing of the 564 
deliberation (for example, a flood event that brings out community spirit will probably 565 
activate different transcendental values to those that would articulated in a debate over 566 
windfarms). Following Kenter, Bryce, et al (2016), it may well be that we hold ‘proto-values’ 567 
that are  partially formed prior to deliberation but which are then more or less fully formed by 568 
each specific context. More research is required to establish this, but if it is the case, the SVT 569 
approach could be developed by reference to the forming and expression of a broad range of 570 
individually-held proto-values. 571 
 572 
In concluding, therefore, the five principles identified in this paper address an established 573 
research question by beginning to codify new rules of the game that are necessary in order for 574 
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deliberative value formation to move centre stage, in terms of value estimation and 575 
sustainability science. The next step is to develop research that can apply, test and revise the 576 
principles into a form that encourages a more standardised and replicable approach to 577 
forming and expressing shared social values for sustainability.  578 
 579 
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